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Abstract. Recently, Li et al. analyzed Lee et al.’s multi-server authentication scheme and
proposed a novel smart card and dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for
multi-server environments. They claimed that their scheme can resist several kinds of attacks.
However, through careful analysis, we find that Li et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart
card and offline dictionary attack, replay attack, impersonation attack and server spoofing at-
tack. By analyzing other similar schemes, we find that the certain type of dynamic ID based
multi-server authentication scheme in which only hash functions are used and no registration
center participates in the authentication and session key agreement phase is hard to provide
perfect efficient and secure authentication. To compensate for these shortcomings, we improve
the recently proposed Liao et al.’s multi-server authentication scheme which is based on pairing
and self-certified public keys, and propose a novel dynamic ID based remote user authentica-
tion scheme for multi-server environments. Liao et al.’s scheme is found vulnerable to offline
dictionary attack and denial of service attack, and cannot provide user’s anonymity and local
password verification. However, our proposed scheme overcomes the shortcomings of Liao et
al.’s scheme. Security and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is secure against
various attacks and has many excellent features.
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2§1 Introduction
With the rapid development of network technologies, more and more people begin using the
network to acquire various services such as on-line financial, on-line medical, on-line shopping,
on-line bill payment, on-line documentation and data exchange, etc. And the architecture
of server providing services to be accessed over the network often consists of many different
servers around the world instead of just one. While enjoying the comfort and convenience of
the internet, people are facing with the emerging challenges from the network security.
Identity authentication is the key security issue of various types of on-line applications and
service systems. Before an user accessing the services provided by a service provider server,
mutual identity authentication between the user and the server is needed to prevent the unau-
thorized personnel from accessing services provided by the server and avoid the illegal system
cheating the user by masquerading as legal server. In the single server environment, password
based authentication scheme [1] and its enhanced version which additionally uses smart cards
[2-9] are widely used to provide mutual authentication between the users and servers. However,
the conventional password based authentication methods are not suitable for the multi-servers
environment since each user does not only need to log into different remote servers repetitively
but also need to remember many various sets of identities and passwords if he/she wants to
access these service providing servers. In order to resolve this problem, in 2000, based on the
difficulty of factorization and hash function, Lee and Chang [10] proposed a user identifica-
tion and key distribution scheme which agrees with the multi-server environment. Since then,
authentication schemes for the multi-server environment have been widely investigated and
designed by many researchers [11-28].
Based on the used of the basic cryptographic algorithms, the existing multi-server authen-
tication schemes can be divided into two types, namely the hash based authentication schemes
and the public-key based authentication schemes. At the same time, among these existing
multi-server authentication schemes, some of them need the registration center (RC) to par-
ticipate in the authentication and session key agreement phase, while others don’t. Therefore,
according to the participation or not of the RC in the authentication and session key agreement
phase, we divide the multi-server authentication schemes into RC dependented authentication
schemes and non-RC dependented authentication schemes.
In this paper, we analyze a novel multi-server authentication scheme, Li et al.’s scheme [20]
which is only based on hash function and a non-RC dependented authentication scheme. We find
that this scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attack, replay attack,
impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. By analyzing some other similar schemes
[15,17-19], we find that the type of dynamic ID based multi-server authentication scheme which
is only using hash functions and non-RC dependented is hard to provide perfect efficient and
secure authentication. To compensate for these shortcomings, we improve the recently proposed
Liao et al.’s multi-server authentication scheme [27] which is based on pairing and self-certified
public keys, and propose a novel dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for
multi-server environments. Liao et al.’s scheme is found vulnerable to offline dictionary attack
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[28] and denial of service attack, and cannot provide user’s anonymity and local password
verification. However, our proposed scheme overcomes the shortcomings of Liao et al.’s scheme.
Security and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is secure against various attacks
and has many excellent features.
§2 Related works
A large number of authentication schemes have been proposed for the multi-server environment.
Hash function is one of the key technologies in the construction of multi-server authentication
scheme. In 2004, Juang et al. [11] proposed an efficient multi-server password authenticated key
agreement scheme based on a hash function and symmetric key cryptosystem. In 2009, Hsiang
and Shih [12] proposed a dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server
environment in which only hash function is used. However, Sood et al. [13] found that Hsiang
and Shih’s scheme is susceptible to replay attack, impersonation attack and stolen smart card
attack. Moreover, the password change phase of Hsiang and Shih’s scheme is incorrect. Then
Sood et al. presented a novel dynamic identity based authentication protocol for multi-server
architecture to resolve the security flaws of Hsiang and Shih’s scheme [13]. After that, Li et al.
[14] pointed out that Sood et al.’s protocol is still vulnerable to leak-of-verifier attack, stolen
smart card attack and impersonation attack. At the same time, Li et al. [14] proposed another
dynamic identity based authentication protocol for multi-server architecture. However, the
above mentioned scheme are all RC dependented multi-server authentication scheme. In 2009,
Liao and Wang [15] proposed a dynamic ID based multi-server authentication scheme which is
based on hash function and non-RC dependented. But, Liao and Wang’s scheme is vulnerable to
insider’s attack, masquerade attack, server spoofing attack, registration center spoofing attack
and is not reparable [16]. After that, Shao et al. [17] and Lee et al. [18,19] proposed some
similar types of multi-server authentication schemes. In 2012, Li et al.[20] pointed out that Lee
et al.’s scheme [18] cannot withstand forgery attack, server spoofing attack and cannot provide
proper authentication, and then proposed a novel dynamic ID based multi-server authentication
schemes which is only using hash function and non-RC dependented. However, with careful
analysis, we find that Li et al.’s scheme [20] is still vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline
dictionary attack, replay attack, impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. We also
analyzed Shao et al.’s scheme [17] and Lee et al.’s scheme [19], they are all vulnerable to
stolen smart card and offline dictionary attack, replay attack, impersonation attack and server
spoofing attack. In general, it is difficult to construct a secure dynamic ID based and non-RC
dependented multi-server authentication scheme if only hash functions are used.
Public-key cryptograph is another useful technique which is widely used in the construction
of multi-server authentication scheme. In 2000, Lee and Chang [21] proposed a user identifi-
cation and key distribution scheme in which the difficulty of factorization on public key cryp-
tography is used. In 2001, Tsaur [22] proposed a remote user authentication scheme based on
RSA cryptosystem and Lagrange interpolating polynomial for multi-server environments. Then
4Lin et al. [23] proposed a multi-server authentication protocol based on the simple geometric
properties of the Euclidean and discrete logarithm problem concept. Since the traditionally
public key cryptographic algorithms require many expensive computations and consume a lot
of energy, Geng and Zhang [24] proposed a dynamic ID-based user authentication and key
agreement scheme for multi-server environment using bilinear pairings. But Geng and Zhang’s
scheme cannot withstand user spoofing attack [25]. After that, Tseng et al. [26] proposed an
efficient pairing-based user authentication scheme with smart cards. However, in 2013, Liao
and Hsiao [27] pointed out that Tseng et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, offline
dictionary attack and malicious server attack, and cannot provide proper mutual authentica-
tion and session key agreement. At the same time, Liao and Hsiao proposed a novel non-RC
dependented multi-server remote user authentication scheme using self-certified public keys for
mobile clients [27]. Recently, Chou et al. [28] found Liao and Hsiao’s scheme cannot withstand
password guessing attack. Furthermore, with careful analysis, we find that Liao and Hsiao’s
scheme is still vulnerable to denial of service attack, and cannot provide user’s anonymity and
local password verification. In this paper, based on the Liao and Hsiao’s scheme, we propose
a secure dynamic ID based and non-RC dependented multi-server authentication scheme using
the pairing and self-certified public keys.
§3 Review and cryptanalysis of Li et al.’s authentication scheme
3.1 Review of Li et al.’s scheme
Li et al.’s contains three participants, the user Ui, the server Sj, and the registration center
RC. RC chooses the master secret key x and a secret number y to compute h(x‖y) and
h(SIDj‖h(y)), and then shares them with Sj via a secure channel. SIDj is the identity of
server Sj . There are four phases in the scheme: registration phase, login phase, verification
phase, and password change phase.
3.1.1 Registration phase
When the remote user authentication scheme starts, the user Ui and the registration center RC
need to perform the following steps to finish the registration phase:
(1) Ui freely chooses his/her identity IDi, the password PWi, and computes Ai = h(b ⊕
PWi), where b is a random number generated by Ui. Then Ui sends IDi and Ai to the
registration center RC for registration through a secure channel.
(2) RC computes Bi = h(IDi‖x), Ci = h(IDi‖h(y)‖Ai), Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)) and Ei =
Bi ⊕ h(x‖y). RC stores {Ci, Di, Ei, h(·), h(y)} on the user’s smart card and sends it to user Ui
via a secure channel.
(3) Ui keys b into the smart card, and finally the smart card contains {Ci, Di, Ei, b, h(·), h(y)}.
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3.1.2 Login phase
Whenever Ui wants to login Sj , he/she must perform the following steps to generate a login
request message:
(1) Ui inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs IDi and PWi. Then
the smart card computes Ai = h(b ⊕ PWi), C
∗
i = h(IDi‖h(y)‖Ai), and checks whether the
computed C∗i is equal to Ci. If they are equal, Ui proceeds the following steps. Otherwise the
smart card aborts the session.
(2) The smart card generates a random numberNi and computes Pij = Ei⊕h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni),
CIDi = Ai ⊕ h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni), M1 = h(Pij‖CIDi‖Di‖Ni) and M2 = h(SIDj‖h(y))⊕Ni.
(3) Ui submits {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2} to Sj as a login request message.
3.1.3 Verification phase
Wher Sj receiving the login message {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2}, Sj and Ui perform the following
steps to finish the mutual authentication and session key agreement.
(1) Sj computes Ni = M2 ⊕ h(SIDj‖h(y)), Ei = Pij ⊕ h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni), Bi = Ei ⊕
h(x‖y), Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)) and Ai = CIDi ⊕ h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni) by using {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2},
h(SIDj‖h(y)) and h(x‖y).
(2) Sj computes h(Pij‖CIDi‖Di‖Ni) and checks whether it is equal to M1. If they are
not equal, Sj rejects the login request and terminates this session. Otherwise, Sj accepts
the login request message. Then Sj generates a random number Nj and computes M3 =
h(Di‖Ai‖Nj‖SIDj), M4 = Ai ⊕Ni ⊕Nj . Finally, Sj sends the message {M3,M4} to Ui.
(3) After receiving the response message {M3,M4} sent from Sj , Ui computes Nj = Ai ⊕
Ni ⊕M4, M
∗
3 = h(Di‖Ai‖Nj‖SIDj) and checks M
∗
3 with the received message M3. If they
are not equal, Ui rejects these messages and terminates this session. Otherwise, Ui suc-
cessfully authenticates Sj . Then, the user Ui computes the mutual authentication message
M5 = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and sends {M5} to the server Sj .
(4) Upon receiving the message {M5} from Ui, Sj computes h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and checks
it with the received message {M5}. If they are equal, Sj successfully authenticates Ui and the
mutual authentication is completed. After the mutual authentication phase, the user Ui and
the server Sj compute SK = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖Nj‖SIDj), which is taken as their session key for
future secure communication.
3.1.4 Password change phase
This phase is invoked whenever Ui wants to change his password PWi to a new password
PWnewi . There is no need for a secure channel for password change, and it can be finished
without communicating with the registration center RC.
(1) Ui inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs IDi and PWi.
(2) The smart card computes Ai = h(b⊕PWi), C
∗
i = h(IDi‖h(y)‖Ai), and checks whether
the computed C∗i is equal to Ci. If they are not equal, the smart card rejects the password
6change request. Otherwise, the user Ui inputs a new password PW
new
i and a new random
number bnew.
(3) The smart card computes Anewi = h(b
new ⊕ PWnewi ) and C
new
i = h(IDi‖h(y)‖A
new
i ).
(4) Finally, the smart card replaces Ci and b with C
new
i and b
new to finish the password
change phase.
3.2 Cryptanalysis of Li et al.’s scheme
Li et al. claimed that their scheme can resist many types of attacks and satisfy all the essential
requirements for multi-server architecture authentication. However, if we assume that A is an
adversary who has broken a user Um and a server Sn, or a combination of a malicious user
Um and a dishonest server Sn. Then A could get the secret number h(x‖y) and h(y), and can
perform the stolen smart card and offline dictionary attack, replay attack, impersonation attack
and server spoofing attack to Li et al.’s scheme. The concrete cryptanalysis of the Li et al.’s
scheme is shown as follows.
3.2.1 Stolen smart card and offline dictionary attack
If a user Ui’s smart card is stolen by an adversaryA, A can extract the information {Ci, Di, Ei, b,
h(·), h(y)} from the memory of the stolen smart card. Furthermore, in case A intercepts a valid
login request message {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2} sent from user Ui to server Sj in the public commu-
nication channel, A can compute Ni = h(SIDj‖h(y))⊕M2, Ei = Pij ⊕ h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni),
Bi = Ei ⊕ h(x‖y), Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)) and Ai = CIDi ⊕ h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni) by using h(y) and
h(x‖y). Then A can launch offline dictionary attack on Ci = h(IDi‖h(y)‖Ai) to know the
identity IDi of the user Ui because A knows the values of Ai corresponding to the user Ui.
Besides A can launch offline dictionary attack on Ai = h(b⊕PWi) to know the password PWi
of Ui because A knows the value of b from the stolen smart card of the user Ui. Now A possesses
the valid smart card of user Ui, knows the identity IDi, password PWi corresponding to the
user Ui and hence can login on to any service server.
3.2.2 Replay attack
The replay attack is replaying the same message of the receiver or the sender again. If adversary
A has intercepted a valid login request message {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2} sent from user Ui to server
Sj in the public communication channel. Then A can compute Ni = h(SIDj‖h(y)) ⊕ M2,
Ei = Pij ⊕ h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni), Bi = Ei ⊕ h(x‖y), Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)) and Ai = CIDi ⊕
h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni) by using h(y) and h(x‖y). Then adversary A can replay this login request
message {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2} to Sj by masquerading as the user Ui at some time latter. After
verification of the login request message, Sj computes M3 = h(Di‖Ai‖Nj‖SIDj) and M4 =
Ai ⊕Ni ⊕Nj , and sends the message {M3,M4} to A who is masquerading as the user Ui. The
adversary A can verify the received value of {M3,M4} and compute M
′
5
= h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj)
since he knows the values of Ni, Ei, Bi, Di and Ai. Then A sends {M
′
5} to the server Sj . The Sj
Dawei Zhao, et al. 7
computes h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and checks it with the received message {M
′
5
}. This equivalency
authenticates the legitimacy of the user Ui, the service provider server Sj and the login request
is accepted. Finally after mutual authentication, adversary A masquerading as the user Ui and
the server Sj agree on the common session key as SK = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖Nj‖SIDj). Therefore,
the adversary A can masquerade as user Ui to login on to server Sj by replaying the same login
request message which had been sent from Ui to Sj.
3.2.3 Impersonation attack
In this subsection, we show that the adversaryA who possesses h(y) and h(x‖y) can masquerade
as any user Ui to login any server Sj as follows.
Adversary A chooses two random numbers ai and bi, and computes Ai = h(ai) and
Bi = h(bi). Then A can compute Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)), Ei = Bi ⊕ h(x‖y), Pij = Ei ⊕
h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni), CIDi = Ai ⊕ h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni), M1 = h(Pij‖CIDi‖Di‖Ni) and M2 =
h(SIDj‖h(y))⊕Ni by using h(y) and h(x‖y). NowA sends the login request message {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2}
by masquerading as the user Ui to server Sj. After receiving the login request message, Sj
computes Ni = h(SIDj‖h(y)) ⊕ M2, Ei = Pij ⊕ h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni), Bi = Ei ⊕ h(x‖y),
Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)) and Ai = CIDi ⊕ h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni) by using {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2}, h(x‖y)
and h(SIDj‖h(y)). Then Sj computes M3 = h(Di‖Ai‖Nj‖SIDj) and M4 = Ai ⊕ Ni ⊕ Nj,
and sends the message {M3,M4} to A who is masquerading as the user Ui. Then adversary
A computes Nj = Ai ⊕ Ni ⊕M4 and verifies M3 by computing h(Di‖Ai‖Nj‖SIDj). Then A
computes M5 = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and sends {M5} back to the server Sj . The Sj computes
h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and checks it with the received message {M5}. This equivalency authen-
ticates the legitimacy of the user Ui, the service provider server Sj and the login request is
accepted. Finally after mutual authentication, adversary A masquerading as the user Ui and
the server Sj agree on the common session key as SK = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖Nj‖SIDj).
3.2.4 Server spoofing attack
In this subsection, we show that the adversary A who possesses h(y) and h(x‖y) can mas-
querade as the server Sj to spoof user Ui, if A has intercepted a valid login request message
{Pij , CIDi,M1,M2} sent from user Ui to server Sj in the public communication channel.
After intercepting a valid login request message {Pij , CIDi,M1,M2} sent from user Ui to
server Sj in the public communication channel, A can compute Ni = h(SIDj‖h(y)) ⊕ M2,
Ei = Pij ⊕ h(h(SIDj‖h(y))‖Ni), Bi = Ei ⊕ h(x‖y), Di = h(Bi‖h(x‖y)) and Ai = CIDi ⊕
h(Di‖SIDj‖Ni) corresponding to Ui. Then A can choose a random number N
′
j , and compute
M3 = h(Di‖Ai‖N
′
j‖SIDj) and M4 = Ai ⊕ Ni ⊕ N
′
j . A then sends the message {M3,M4} by
masquerading as server Sj to the user Ui. After receiving the message {M3,M4}, Ui computes
N ′j = Ai ⊕ Ni ⊕M4 and verifies M3 by computing h(Di‖Ai‖N
′
j‖SIDj). Then Ui computes
M5 = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and sends it to the Sj who is masquerading as the adversary A.
Then A computes h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖SIDj) and checks it with the received message {M5}. Finally
8after mutual authentication, adversary A masquerading as the server Sj and the user Ui agree
on the common session key as SK = h(Di‖Ai‖Ni‖N
′
j‖SIDj).
3.3 Discussion
Except the Li et al.’s scheme, we also analyzed other four dynamic ID based authentication
schemes for multi-server environment [15,17-19]. These schemes are all based on hash functions
and non-RC dependented. We found that such type of multi-server remote user authentication
scheme are almost vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, imperson-
ation attack and server spoofing attack etc. The cryptanalysis methods of these schemes are
similar to that of Li et al.’s scheme shown in section 3.2. We think that under the assump-
tions that no registration center participates in the authentication and session key agreement
phase, the dynamic ID and hash function based user authentication schemes for multi-server
environment is hard to provide perfect efficient and secure authentication. Fortunately, there
is another technique, public-key cryptograph which is widely used in the construction of au-
thentication scheme. Therefore, in order to construct a secure, low power consumption and
non-RC dependented authentication scheme, we adopt the elliptic curve cryptographic technol-
ogy of public-key techniques, and propose a novel dynamic ID based and non-RC dependented
remote user authentication scheme using pairing and self-certified public keys for multi-server
environment.
§4 Preliminaries
Before presenting our scheme, we introduce the concepts of bilinear pairings, self-certified public
keys, as well as some related mathematical assumptions.
4.1 Bilinear pairings
Let G1 be an additive cyclic group with a large prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative cyclic
group with the same order q. Particularly, G1 is a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic
curve over a finite field E(Fp) and G2 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group over a finite
field. P is a generator of G1.
A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 and satisfies the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q .
(2) Non-degenerate: There exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
(3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
4.2 self-certified public keys
In [27], Liao et al. first proposes a key distribution based on self-certified public keys (SCPKs)
[29,30] among the service servers. By using the SCPK, a user’s public key can be computed
directly from the signature of the third trust party (TTP) on the user’s identity instead of
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verifying the public key using an explicit signature on a user’s public key. The SCPK scheme
is described as follows.
(1) Initialization: The third trust party (TTP) first generates all the needed parameters of
the scheme. TTP chooses a non-singular high elliptic curve E(Fp) defined over a finite field,
which is used with a based point generator P of prime order q. Then TTP freely chooses his/her
secret key sT and computes his/her public key pubT = sT · P . The related parameters and
pubT are publicly and authentically available.
(2) Private key generation: An user A chooses a random number kA, computes KA = kA ·P
and sends his/her identity IDA and KA to the TTP. TTP chooses a random number rA,
computes WA = KA + rA · P and s¯A = h(IDA ‖ WA) + rA, and sends WA and s¯A to user A.
Then A obtains his/her secret key by calculating sA = s¯A + kA.
(3) Public key extraction: Anyone can calculate A’s public key pubA = h(IDA ‖WA)pubT +
WA when he/she receives WA.
4.3 Related mathematical assumptions
To prove the security of our proposed protocol, we present some important mathematical prob-
lems and assumptions for bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves. The related concrete
description can be found in [31,32].
(1) Computational discrete logarithm (CDL) problem: Given R = x · P , where P,R ∈ G1.
It is easy to calculate R given x and P , but it is hard to determine x given P and R.
(2) Elliptic curve factorization (ECF) problem: Given two points P and R = x · P + y · P
for x, y ∈ Z∗q , it is hard to find x · P and y · P .
(3) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given P, xP, yP ∈ G1, it is hard to
compute xyP ∈ G1.
§5 The proposed scheme
In this section, by improving the recently proposed Liao et al.’s multi-server authentication
scheme [27] which is found vulnerable to offline dictionary attack and denial of service attack
[28], and cannot provide user’s anonymity and local password verification, we propose a novel
dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment using pairing
and self-certified public keys. Our scheme contains three participants: the user Ui, the service
provider server Sj , and the registration center RC. The legitimate user Ui can easily login
on to the service provider server using his smart card, identity and password. There are six
phases in the proposed scheme: system initialization phase, the user registration phase, the
server registration phase, the login phase, the authentication and session key agreement phase,
and the password change phase. The notations used in our proposed scheme are summarized
in Table 1.
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Table 1: Notations used in the proposed scheme.
e A bilinear map, e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2.
Ui The ith user.
IDi The identity of the user Ui.
Sj The jth service provider server.
SIDj The identity of the service provider server Sj .
RC The registration center.
sRC The master secret key of the registration center RC in Z
∗
q .
pubRC The public key of RC, pubRC = sRC · P .
P A generator of group G1.
H() A map-to-point function, H : 0, 1∗ −→ G1.
h() A one way hash function, h : 0, 1∗ −→ 0, 1k, where k is the
output length. h() allows the concatenation of some integer
values and points on an elliptic curve.
⊕ A simple XOR operation in G1. If P1, P2 ∈ G1, P1 and P2 are
points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, the operation
P1 ⊕ P2 means that it performs the XOR operations of the
x-coordinates and y-coordinates of P1 and P2, respectively.
‖ The concatenation operation.
5.1 System initialization phase
In the proposed scheme, registration center RC is assumed a third trust party. In the system
initialization phase, RC generates all the needed parameters of the scheme.
(1) RC selects a cyclic additive group G1 of prime order q, a cyclic multiplicative group G2
of the same order q, a generator P of G1, and a bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2.
(2) RC freely chooses a number sRC ∈ Z
∗
q keeping as the system private key and computes
pubRC = sRC · P as the system public key.
(3) RC selects two cryptographic hash functions H(·) and h(·).
Finally, all the related parameters {e,G1, G2, q, P, PubRC , H(·), h(·)} are publicly and au-
thentically available.
5.2 User registration phase
When the user Ui wants to access the services, he/she has to submit his/her some related
information to the registration center RC for registration. The steps of the user registration
phase are as follows:
(1) The user Ui freely chooses his/her identity IDi and password pwi, and chooses a random
number bi. Then Ui computes HPWi = h(IDi ‖ pwi ‖ bi) · P , and submits IDi and HPWi to
RC for registration via a secure channel.
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(2) When receiving the message IDi and HPWi, RC computes QIDi = H(IDi), CIDi =
sRC · QIDi, RegIDi = CIDi ⊕ sRC ·HPWi and Hi = h(QIDi ‖ CIDi). Then RC stores the
message {RegIDi, Hi} in Ui’s smart card and submits the smart card to Ui through a secure
channel.
(3) After receiving the smart card, Ui enters bi into the smart card. Finally, the smart card
contains parameters {RegIDi, Hi, bi}.
5.3 Server registration phase
If a service provider server Sj wants to provides services for the users, he/she must perform
the registration to the registration center RC to become a legal service provider server. The
process of server registration phase of the proposed scheme is based on SCPK mentioned in
section 4.2.
(1) Sj chooses a random number vj and computes Vj = vj · P . Then Sj submits SIDj and
Vj to RC for registration via a secure channel.
(2) After receiving the message {SIDj, Vj}, RC chooses a random number wj , and computes
Wj = wj · P + Vj and s
′
j = (sRC · h(SIDj ‖ Wj) + wj) mod q. Then RC submits the message
{Wj , s
′
j} to Sj through a secure channel.
(3) After receiving {Wj , s
′
j}, Sj computes the private key sj = (s
′
j + vj) mod q, and checks
the validity of the values issued to him/her by checking the following equation: pubj = sj ·P =
h(SIDj ‖Wj) · pubRC +Wj . At last, Sj ’s personal information contains {SIDj, pubj, sj ,Wj}
The details of user registration phase and server registration phase are shown in Fig.1.
5.4 Login phase
If user Ui wants to access the services provided by server Sj, Ui needs to login on to Sj , the
process of the login phase are as following:
(1) Ui inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity IDi and
password pwi. Then the smart card computes QIDi = H(IDi), CIDi = RegIDi ⊕ h(IDi ‖
pwi ‖ bi) · pubRC , H
∗
i = h(QIDi ‖ CIDi), and checks whether H
∗
i = Hi. If they are equal, it
means Ui is a legal user. Otherwise the smart card aborts the session.
(2) The smart card generates two random numbers ui and ri, and computes DIDi =
ui ·QIDi and Ri = ri ·P . Then the smart card sends the login request message {DIDi, Ri} to
server Sj over a public channel.
5.5 Authentication and session key agreement phase
(1) After receiving the login request {DIDi, Ri} sent from Ui, Sj chooses a random number rj ,
and computes Rj = rj ·P , Tji = rj ·Ri, Kji = sj ·Ri and Authji = h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖ Kji ‖ Rj).
Then Sj sends the message {Wj , Rj , Authji} to Ui.
(2) When receiving {Wj , Rj , Authji}, Ui computes Tij = ri · Rj , pubj = h(SIDj ‖ Wj) ·
pubRC +Wj , Kij = ri ·pubj and Authij = h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖ Kij ‖ Rj). Then Ui checks Authij
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Figure 1: User and server registration phase of the proposed scheme.
with the received Authji. If they are not equal, Ui terminates this session. Otherwise, Sj is
authenticated, and Ui continues to compute Mi = ri ·DIDi, Ni = ui · CIDi, dij = h(DIDi ‖
SIDj ‖ Kij ‖Mi) and Bi = (ri + dij) ·Ni. Finally, Ui sends the message {Mi, Bi} to Sj .
(3) After receiving the message {Mi, Bi} sent from Ui, Sj computes dji = h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖
Kji ‖Mi) and checks whether e(Mi + dji ·DIDi, pubRC) = e(Bi, P ). If they are not equal, Sj
terminates this session. Otherwise, Ui is authenticated.
Finally, the user Ui and the server Sj agree on a common session key as Ui : SK = h(DIDi ‖
SIDj ‖ Kij ‖ Tij), Sj : SK = h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖ Kji ‖ Tji).
The login phase and authentication and session key agreement phase are depicted in Fig.2.
5.6 Password change phase
The following steps show the process of the password change phase of a user Ui.
(1) The user Ui inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity IDi
and password pwi. Then the smart card computes QIDi = H(IDi), CIDi = RegIDi ⊕h(IDi ‖
pwi ‖ bi) · pubRC , H
∗
i = h(QIDi ‖ CIDi), and checks whether H
∗
i = Hi. If they are equal, it
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means Ui is a legal user. Otherwise the smart card aborts the session.
(2) The smart card generates a random number zi, and computes Zi = zi · P and AIDi =
CIDi ⊕ zi · pubRC . Then the smart card sends the message {IDi, AIDi, Zi} to the registration
center RC.
(3) After receiving the message {IDi, AIDi, Zi}, RC computes CIDi = AIDi ⊕ sRC · Zi,
QIDi = H(IDi), and checks whether e(CIDi, P ) = e(QIDi, pubRC). If they are equal, user Ui
is authenticated. Then RC computes V1 = h(CIDi ‖ sRC · Zi) and sends {V1} to Ui.
(4) When receiving {V1}, user computes h(CIDi ‖ zi ·pubRC) and checks it with the received
V1. If they are equal, the registration center RC is authenticated. Then Ui chooses his/her
new password pwnewi and the new random number b
new
i , and computes HPW
new
i = h(IDi ‖
pwnewi ‖ b
new
i ) · P , V2 = HPW
new
i ⊕ zi · pubRC and V3 = h(CIDi ‖ zi · pubRC ‖ HPW
new
i ).
Then Ui submits {V2, V3} to RC.
(5) Upon receiving the response {V2, V3}, the registration server RC computes HPW
new
i =
V2 ⊕ sRC · Zi and V
∗
3 = h(CIDi ‖ sRC · Zi ‖ HPW
new
i ). Then RC compares V
∗
3 with the
received V3. If they are equal, RC continues to compute Reg
new
IDi
= CIDi ⊕ sRC · HPW
new
i ,
V4 = Reg
new
IDi
⊕ sRC · Zi and V5 = h(sRC · Zi ‖ Reg
new
IDi
). After that, RC sends {V4, V5} to Ui.
(6) After receiving {V4, V5}, Ui computes Reg
new
IDi
= V4⊕ zi · pubRC and V
∗
5
= h(zi · pubRC ‖
RegnewIDi ). Then Ui checks whether V
∗
5 = V5. If they are equal, user Ui replaces the original
RegIDi and bi with Reg
new
IDi
and bnewi .
The details of a password change phase of the proposed scheme are shown in Fig.3.
§6 Security analysis
6.1 Stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks
In the proposed scheme, we assume that if a smart card is stolen, physical protection methods
cannot prevent malicious attackers to get the stored secure elements. At the same time, adver-
sary A can access to a big dictionary of words that likely includes user’s password and intercept
the communications between the user and server.
In the proposed scheme, in case a user Ui’s smart card is stolen by an adversary A, he can
extract {RegIDi, Hi} from the memory of the stolen smart card. At the same time, it is assumed
that adversaryA has intercepted a previous full session messages {DIDi, Ri,Wj , Rj , Authji,Mi, Bi}
between the user Ui and server Sj. However, the adversary still cannot obtain the Ui’s identity
IDi and password pwi except guessing IDi and pwi at the same time. Therefore, it is impossi-
ble to get the Ui’s identity IDi and password pwi from stolen smart card and offline dictionary
attack in our proposed scheme.
6.2 Replay attack
Replaying a message of previous session into a new session is useless in our proposed scheme
because user’s smart card and the server choose different rand numbers ri and rj , and the
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user’identity is different in each new session, which make all messages dynamic and valid for
that session only. If we assume that an adversary A replies an intercepted previous login request
{DIDi, Ri} to Sj , after receiving the response message {Wj , Rj , Authji} sent from Sj , A cannot
compute the correct response message {Mi, Bi} to pass the Sj’s authentication since he does
not know the values of IDi, pwi, ui and ri. Therefore, the proposed scheme is robust for the
replay attack.
6.3 Impersonation attack
If an adversary A wants to masquerade as a legal user Ui to pass the authentication of a server
Sj , he must have the values of both QIDi and CIDi. However, QIDi and CIDi are protected
by Ui’s smart card, IDi and pwi since QIDi = H(IDi) and CIDi = RegIDi ⊕ h(IDi ‖ pwi ‖
bi) · pubRC . Therefore, unless the adversary A can obtain the Ui’s smart card, IDi and pwi at
the same time, the proposed scheme is secure to the impersonation attack.
6.4 Server spoofing attack
If an adversary A wants to masquerade as a legal server Sj to cheat a user Ui, he must cal-
culate a valid Authji which is embedded with the shared secret key Kji = sj · Ri to pass the
authentication of Ui. However, adversary A cannot derive the shared secret key Kji without
knowing the private key sj of the server Sj . Therefore, our scheme is secure against the server
spoofing attack.
6.5 Insider attack
In the proposed scheme, the registration center RC cannot obtain the Ui’s password pwi. Since
in the registration phase, Ui chooses a random number bi and sends IDi and HPWi = h(IDi ‖
pwi ‖ bi) · P to RC, RC can not derive pwi from HPWi based on CDL problem. Therefore,
the proposed scheme is robust for insider attack.
6.6 Denial of service attack
In denial of service attack, an adversary A updates identity and password verification informa-
tion on smart card to some arbitrary value and hence legitimate user cannot login successfully in
subsequent login request to the server. In the proposed scheme, smart card checks the validity
of user Ui’s identity IDi and password pwi before password update procedure. An adversary
can insert the stolen smart card of the user Ui into smart card reader and has to guess the
identity IDi and password pwi correctly corresponding to the user Ui. Since the smart card
computes H∗i = h(QIDi ‖ CIDi), and compares it with the stored value of Hi in its memory to
verify the legitimacy of the user Ui before smart card accepts password update request. It is not
possible to guess identity IDi and password pwi correctly at the same time in real polynomial
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time even after getting the smart card of the user Ui. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure
against the denial of service attack.
6.7 Perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy means that even if an adversary compromises all the passwords of the
users, it still cannot compromise the session key. In the proposed scheme, the session key
SK = h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖ Kij ‖ Tij) (SK = h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖ Kji ‖ Tji)) is generated by three
one-time random numbers ui, ri and rj in each session. These one-time random numbers are
only held by the user Ui and the server Sj , and cannot be retrieved from SK based on the
security of CDH problem. Thus, even if an adversary obtains previous session keys, it cannot
compromise other session key. Hence, the proposed scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy.
6.8 User’s anonymity
In our proposed scheme, the user Ui’s login message is different in each login phase. Among
each login message, DIDi = ui ·H(IDi) is associated with a random number ui which is known
by Ui only. Therefore, any adversary cannot identity the real identity of the logon user and our
scheme can provide the user’s anonymity.
6.9 No verification table
In our proposed scheme, it is obvious that the user, the server and the registration center do
not maintain any verification table.
6.10 Local password verification
In the proposed scheme, smart card checks the validity of user Ui’s identity IDi and password
pwi before logging into server Sj . Since the adversary cannot compute the correct CIDi without
the knowledge of IDi and pwi to pass the verification equation H
∗
i = Hi, thus our scheme can
avoid the unauthorized accessing by the local password verification.
6.11 Proper mutual authentication
In our scheme, the user first authenticates the server. Ui sends the message {DIDi, Ri} to the
server Sj to build an connection. After receiving the response message {Wj , Rj, Authji} sent
from Sj , Ui computes Tij , pubj, Kij , Authij , and checks whether Authij = Authji. If they are
equal, Sj is authenticated by Ui. Otherwise, Ui stops to login onto this server. Since Authji =
h(DIDi ‖ SIDj ‖ Kji ‖ Rj) and Kji = sj ·Ri, an adversary A cannot compute the correct Kji
without the knowledge of value of sj . Any fabricated message {W
′
j , R
′
j , Auth
′
ji} cannot pass
the verification. Then Ui computes Mi, Ni, dij , Bi, and sends the message {Mi, Bi} to Sj.
After receiving the message {Mi, Bi} sent from Ui, Sj computes dji and checks whether e(Mi+
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Table 2: Computational cost comparison of our scheme and other schemes.
Proposed scheme Liao et al.’scheme [27] Tseng et al.’scheme [26]
C1 3TGmul+TGH+2Th 3TGmul+TGH+Th 2TGmul+TGH+Th
C2 8TGmul+TGH+TGadd+5Th 5TGmul+TGH+TGadd+5Th 3TGmul+2Th
C3 2TGe+4TGmul+TGadd+2Th 2TGe+5TGmul+TGadd+2Th 2TGe+TGmul+TGH+TGadd+Th
dji · DIDi, pubRC) = e(Bi, P ). If they are not equal, Sj terminates this session. Otherwise,
Ui is authenticated. Since Bi = (ri + dij) ·Ni, an adversary A cannot compute the correct Bi
without the knowledge of values of ui and ri etc. Any fabricated message {M
′
i , B
′
i} cannot pass
the verification. Therefore, our proposed scheme can provide proper mutual authentication.
§7 Performance comparison and functionality analysis
In this section, we compares the performance and functionality of our proposed scheme with
some previously schemes. To analyze the computation cost, some notations are defined as
follows.
TGe: The time of executing a bilinear map operation, e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2.
TGmul: The time of executing point scalar multiplication on the group G1.
TGH : The time of executing a map-to-point hash function H(.).
TGadd: The time of executing point addition on the group G1.
Th: The time of executing a one-way hash function h(.).
Since the XOR operation and the modular multiplication operation require very few com-
putations, it is usually negligible considering their computation cost.
Table 2 shows the performance comparisons of our proposed scheme and some other re-
lated protocols. We mainly focus on three computation costs including: C1, the total time of
all operations executed in the user registration phase; C2, the total time spent by the user
during the process of login phase and verification phase; C3, the total time spent by the
server during the process of verification phase. As shown in Table 2, Tseng et al.’s scheme
are more efficient in terms of computation cost. However, Tseng et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to
stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, server spoofing attack and insider attack, and
cannot provide perfect forward secrecy, user’s anonymity, proper mutual authentication and
session key agreement. In our proposed scheme, the total computation cost of the user (C2)
is 9TGmul+TGH+TGadd+5Th. But similar to that in Liao et al.’s scheme, the user Ui can
pre-compute Ri = ri · P in the client, and then the computation cost of the user (C2) requires
8TGmul+TGH+TGadd+5Th on-line computation. It can be found that our proposed scheme
spends a little more computation cost than Liao et al.’s scheme in C2, and the others are almost
equal. However, Liao et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary
attacks and denial of service attack, and cannot provide user’s anonymity and local password
verification.
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Table 3: Functionality comparisons among related multi-server authentication protocols.
Proposed Liao Tseng Li Lee Shao Lee
scheme et al. et al. et al. et al. et al. et al.
[27] [26] [20] [18] [17] [19]
Resist stolen smart card and Yes No No No No No No
offline dictionary attacks
Resist replay attack Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Resist impersonation attack Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Resist server spoofing attack Yes Yes No No No No No
Resist insider attack Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Resist denial of service attack Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Perfect forward secrecy Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
User’s anonymity Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
No verification table Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local password verification Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Proper mutual authentication Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Table 3 lists the functionality comparisons among our proposed scheme and other related
schemes. It is obviously that our scheme has many excellent features and is more secure than
other related schemes.
§8 Conclusion
In this paper, we point out that Li et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline
dictionary attack, replay attack, impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. Further-
more, by analyzing some other similar schemes, we find the certain type of dynamic ID based
and non-RC dependented multi-server authentication scheme in which only hash functions are
used is hard to provide perfect efficient and secure authentication. To compensate for these
shortcomings, we improve the Liao et al.’s multi-server authentication scheme which is based
on pairing and self-certified public keys, and propose a novel dynamic ID based and non-RC
dependented remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments. The security
and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is secure against various attacks and has
many excellent features.
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Figure 2: Login and verification phase of the proposed scheme.
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